Morocco’s elections: Fragmentation, disengagement and PJD’s major return | Elections News

Morocco’s parliamentary elections have reshaped the balance between the country’s main parties amid sharply lower turnout.

According to provisional results, the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) emerged from Wednesday’s voting as the largest party with 97 seats, up from 87 in 2021.

The National Rally of Independents (RNI), which led the government after the last election, fell from 102 seats to 66.

The Istiqlal Party dropped from 81 to 65 seats while the Justice and Development Party (PJD) staged a striking comeback, rising from just 13 seats to 54.

The remaining seats were distributed among several other parties.

Only 38,08 percent of registered voters turned out, compared with 50,86 percent in 2021. The figure was also below the 42,27 percent recorded in 2016.

Morocco has seen considerable social and political mobilisation in recent years, including protests involving younger Moroccans over employment, healthcare, education and living costs. The elections, therefore, were held against a backdrop in which political and social grievances have been expressed outside the ballot box as well as through parties and elections.

A major reshuffling of the governing party balance

The three parties that formed the outgoing government did not emerge from the elections with the same parliamentary weight.

Apart from PAM, which gained 10 seats, RNI shed 36 seats and Istiqlal lost 16.

The three parties remain among the main forces in parliament, but their relative weight has changed substantially since 2021.

RNI was the largest party after the 2021 elections and went on to lead the government. Five years later, PAM has moved into first place in the provisional results while RNI and Istiqlal are separated by just one seat.

PAM’s 97 seats put it at the starting point of the government formation process. Under Article 47 of Morocco’s Constitution, the king appoints the head of government from the political party that comes first in elections for the House of Representatives.

That gives PAM the first position in the process, but it does not give the party a parliamentary majority. A majority in the 395-member House requires at least 198 seats.

According to the provisional figures, PAM, RNI and Istiqlal could renew their three-party coalition without bringing in another party.

Together they hold 228 of the 395 seats, comfortably above the 198 needed for a majority. Whether tensions exposed during the campaign can be put aside is a separate question.

PAM and RNI spent the campaign trading accusations despite having governed together for five years. Their disagreements became part of the electoral contest itself, alongside the competition over the government’s record and the parties’ respective programmes.

The possibility of another coalition between the two parties was also questioned during the campaign.

Fatima Ezzahra El Mansouri, PAM’s national coordinator, said that if RNI came first, she personally would not want to join another government led by the party. She stressed that the final decision on post-election alliances would belong to PAM’s National Council.

Mohamed Mehdi Bensaid, another senior PAM figure, also ruled out a renewed coalition with RNI if the latter finished first.

The dispute between the two parties was not limited to coalition politics. RNI accused PAM of trying to recruit its local figures and elected officials before the elections while PAM responded by pointing to defections to RNI before the 2021 elections.

With PAM now first and RNI second, those tensions will form part of the backdrop to coalition negotiations.

The PJD’s comeback

The PJD’s comeback is the other major change in the new parliament.

Its collapse in 2021 was dramatic. After winning 125 seats in 2016, the party was reduced to just 13 five years later.

It has now returned with 54 seats.

That puts the PJD among the four largest parties in the new parliament although it remains well below its 2016 result.

The PJD’s relationship with PAM makes the question of its possible role particularly relevant.

The two parties have long been political opponents. PJD leaders have accused PAM of being created in large part to counter the PJD and limit its political rise.

That criticism resurfaced after Fouzi Lekjaa joined PAM. Former PJD head of government and current party leader Abdelilah Benkirane has argued that Lekjaa’s arrival was intended to counter the PJD. That is Benkirane’s political interpretation rather than an established fact.

Lekjaa is now a senior PAM figure after joining the party’s Political Bureau. He was already a prominent public figure through his leadership of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation, which he has headed since 2014, and through his role as minister delegate in charge of the budget in the outgoing government, a post he held as a nonpartisan minister before joining PAM.

His move into party politics has brought a high-profile figure from football and government into the centre of electoral politics. His entry into PAM has also made him one of the figures being discussed in connection with the next government.

Abdellah Bouanou, one of the PJD’s leading parliamentary figures, has described his relationship with Lekjaa as a good, professional, human relationship despite the political divide between their parties.

Together, PAM, RNI, Istiqlal and the PJD hold 282 seats. Whether the PJD remains in opposition or becomes part of a future governing arrangement will depend on the negotiations that follow.

The turnout question

The reasons for nonparticipation are not uniform, and the election figures alone do not establish why individual voters stayed away from polling stations.

The 2026 figure is the second-lowest turnout recorded in parliamentary elections since King Mohammed VI succeeded his father, Hassan II, in 1999 after the 37 percent recorded in 2007.

Possible explanations for nonparticipation discussed in Morocco include dissatisfaction with established parties, economic concerns and perceptions about the effectiveness of electoral politics. These factors may differ across regions and age groups.

Regional figures underline that point. Participation was much higher in some southern regions, reaching 77 percent in Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra and 61 percent in Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab.

The numbers leave two questions: Which parties can assemble the next governing majority, and what explains the decision of most registered voters not to take part?

The first will be decided through coalition negotiations. The second will require looking beyond the seat totals.