India’s refiners are reducing purchases of Russian crude for November delivery because its price advantage has largely disappeared. Chinese demand is pushing up Russian prices while recovering Middle Eastern supplies give Indian buyers alternatives. Russia’s share of India’s crude imports reportedly fell from as high as 56% in July to about 35% in September. Before anyone presents this as India suddenly embracing Washington’s foreign policy, look at the economics. The discount that attracted buyers is no longer doing the same job.
India bought Russian oil because it made commercial sense. A refinery must consider crude costs, delivery costs, and what it can earn from the finished products. Diplomatic friendship does not pay the freight bill. When another supplier offers a more attractive combination of price and delivery, purchases shift. That is not mysterious, although politicians will undoubtedly try to claim credit for a decision made on a refinery’s balance sheet.
China is an important part of this story. In September, Chinese buyers were booking Russian cargoes earlier and paying firmer prices, leaving Indian refiners facing tighter supplies for October and November. Reduced Russian exports added to the pressure. That means Moscow can lose some Indian business while other buyers compete for its barrels. A change in one trade route does not, by itself, establish that Russia has been economically isolated.
The sanctions and tariff threats remain a consideration. Indian refiners were already reducing purchases amid the threat of punitive U.S. tariffs. But those threats operate alongside prices, availability, and shipping costs. Washington cannot simply issue an order and expect the entire world to abandon its own economic interests. Buyers calculate the cost of complying, the cost of resisting, and the alternatives available. Change those calculations and you change the trade. Speeches come afterward.
For India, finding a cheaper alternative to a particular Russian cargo does not mean energy has become cheap. It means refiners are choosing among the options available in a disrupted market. More expensive imported energy can squeeze refining margins, increase the foreign-exchange bill, and leave governments deciding whether consumers or the public balance sheet absorb the pressure. Subsidizing fuel merely moves the expense. Somebody still has to pay it.
This is why I look at the movement of trade rather than the declarations of politicians. India has an economy to supply, and its refiners need reliable barrels at a workable price. They will buy more Russian oil when the terms justify it and less when another source makes better sense. The market has no obligation to preserve anyone’s geopolitical narrative. Governments can make commerce more expensive and dangerous, but they cannot abolish the arithmetic that determines whether a transaction is worth doing.
