Each time the United States seeks to reduce its military footprint in the Middle East, it finds itself pulled back in. The Iran war, for all its flaws, could offer a chance for a genuine reset.
When the Iran war finally does reach some kind of conclusion, the United States will not simply pack up and leave the Middle East, no matter how much more damage Tehran inflicts. But Washington must seek to reshape its military presence. That seems likely to involve a reduction in troops and equipment and the recognition that, over time, the Persian Gulf states could view America as merely one security partner among many options.
This new, more piecemeal posture would mean ceding power and influence. The Middle East would no longer develop on U.S. terms. But it would allow Washington to focus on its core interests and not get bogged down in unpopular regional wars. It would also give Arab states greater ability to build their own security apparatus. Building a new Middle East future will require guts, leave partners frustrated and impose major financial costs, but it’s a price worth paying.
Under its “America first” agenda, the Trump administration has sought to remake the U.S. role in much of the world. The agenda aimed to move away from American underwriting of global security. The administration’s strategy in the Middle East has been unclear, however — and the Iran war highlighted its contradictions. As a candidate, Donald Trump criticized U.S. involvement in overseas conflict. His administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy claimed that the Iran threat was diminished. Yet he embarked on another devastating war that entrenched the Islamic republic’s leadership and caused Tehran to retaliate — with conflicting objectives.
Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in February, nearly all U.S. bases and military installations in the region have been damaged, rendering the tools once used to project power far less effective. Rebuilding that same footprint poses a serious risk. Technology has changed since American bases in the Middle East were built, many over half a century ago. More recent upgrades have helped, but the bases are outmoded and air defenses insufficient to counter the threat.
Iran has expanded its medium- and longer-range missile capacity and developed drones that have wreaked havoc on battlefields from Ukraine to the Gulf. Tehran’s ability to accurately strike U.S. outposts means that, after the war is over, it will make little sense for Washington to continue to station significant numbers of troops and aircraft at major bases within Iran’s reach. Already, Iran’s missiles and drones have damaged at least 81 aircraft — and that doesn’t take into account the human toll. At least 21 U.S. service members have been killed and almost 900 wounded, while thousands of Iranians have been killed, including numerous civilians. Countries throughout the Middle East have suffered military and civilian casualties.
The United States still needs to project power in the Middle East — especially if a postwar Iran tries to rebuild its military strength.
The United States could decide to reconstruct some of its damaged bases, but the price tag would be astronomical. New security measures, such as hardened aircraft shelters and underground communication facilities, would also need to be built. Instead, Washington should seek a smaller, conditional footprint. To do that, it would need advantageous access — agreements that govern its use of bases, airspace and ability to launch operations from its partners’ territory — so that it could still conduct military operations from the Middle East.
Washington could seek to shift to a more distributed basing structure, operating smaller outposts farther from the Iranian threat in places like western Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. That would mean building in a way to allow for smaller numbers of U.S. personnel to rotate through when needed. But that would require buy-in from partners, whose permission would be needed for access and new bases. Washington might push the Gulf states to foot much of the bill, as they have done in the past.
But the Gulf states are increasingly doubtful about Washington’s commitment to their security. Their wariness isn’t new, but it has deepened since the Iran war began. Their primary security guarantor launched a prolonged conflict that threatens their territory, stability and economies. The war has already made the region poorer — Saudi Arabia’s economy has contracted by almost 2 percent, Bloomberg Economics has found. The longer the war lasts, the tighter the financial squeeze.
The result is a faster push to diversify partnerships — and not merely as a hedge. For now, no one can match America’s security guarantees or political weight, but over time, Gulf-centered alliances and relationships with other powers could take priority. Middle Eastern states are already laying the foundations for an independent regional security architecture through initiatives like the Mecca Pact, signed during the summer to enshrine Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani defense cooperation. Such efforts remain nascent, but they are a step toward ensuring that regional countries have control over their own defense and future. But if the Gulf states want the United States to stay engaged, they must ensure that new partnerships don’t come at the expense of U.S. ability to operate.
The United States cannot scale back its presence and keep all its influence in the Middle East — but a smaller, more agile presence may be worth the trade-offs. Operationally, it would reduce risks to U.S. forces. It would also be an easier sell at home: Overseas conflicts have proven consistently unpopular with American voters. But creating a dispersed posture means building more infrastructure — not a great look as Washington seeks to spend less on the Middle East. It would also mean changing how and where American forces operate, which is likely to be met with frustration in Gulf capitals that could close their doors the next time America asks for access.
This reinforces the importance of the U.S. military presence in Europe for power projection, another region where Washington is trying to downsize to much dismay. Realizing America’s goals in the Middle East regions depends on the very countries its changed role has and is likely to upset.
This vision may be politically difficult to achieve. But it may result in a better outcome for each stakeholder. The United States can adjust its posture to better protect its forces and capabilities, and achieve a longstanding goal of reducing its Middle East commitments. But it will need to continue working and communicating with Gulf partners to do so. The Gulf can begin to wean itself off its sole security guarantor, charting its own course on defense and security — while allowing a continued U.S. presence.
The Iran war reshaped the Middle East and gave Washington a chance to rethink its role there. Less American influence in return for a more sustainable, safer military presence better suited to the realities of modern war and in line with core U.S. interests — and a region with greater control over its own security — may be a trade worth making.
