PRAGMATISM TAKES PRECEDENCE
Tellingly, many worry that ASEAN risks becoming an “arena of major power competition” and its members may become “major power proxies”. The reciprocal tariffs started as a trade war between the US and China, but then quickly affected others that simply met the “trade deficit” narrative, especially emerging economies like ASEAN.
As a result of the highly aggressive tariffs – a universal baseline of 10 per cent for all including trade surplus countries like Singapore, and additional rates somewhat-proportional to the trade imbalances – analysts have put recession risks above 60 per cent. Many economists are anticipating higher inflation, unemployment and inequality as add-ons.
Unsurprisingly, the reciprocal tariffs will likely heighten Southeast Asia’s distrust in the US, potentially opening room for other major powers to replace. Even before Liberation Day, 46.9 per cent of the ISEAS survey respondents identified “new US leadership” (ie, Mr Trump) as a chief geopolitical concern, up from 18.8 per cent in 2024, which cited the “2024 US presidential elections” as a concern.
In the last two years, Southeast Asians have shifted back and forth between the US and China relating to strategic alignment and confidence in them on global free trade.
Most Southeast Asians aligned with China in 2024, but this was replaced by the US this year (52.3 per cent vs China’s 47.7 per cent). Southeast Asians had the most confidence in the US on the global free trade agenda in 2024, but this shifted to China in 2025 (20.6 per cent vs US’ 19 per cent).
What this shows is that Southeast Asia has become more flexible in which major power they prefer, driven by pragmatism than loyalty.
Interestingly, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were the only ASEAN countries where distrust for the US exceeded trust. These three countries also happen to have the highest perceived contribution to ASEAN, potentially guiding an ASEAN consensus.
