The United States possesses the world’s most advanced military equipment, and quality matters immensely in combat. But quantity gets a say, too. And from ships to shells to soldiers, the U.S. military lacks the personnel and materiel it needs to fight a major war.
America’s armed forces, with a naval fleet roughly half the size it was in 1987 alongside an increasingly smaller and older fleet of combat aircraft, are equipped only for short, sharp, high-intensity conflicts. What happens when a war is longer and more violent? Ukraine’s fight against Russia, Israel’s battles in the Middle East and recent U.S. operations against the Houthis in Yemen offer a preview of the demands of modern war and demonstrate why America requires more than we have now to win a large conflict.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s mandate from President Trump to refocus the Pentagon should ensure America’s military has the resources to endure and win a large-scale war. Progressives and fiscal hawks have their knives out for military spending, but the secretary should refrain from cuts to resources that directly strengthen America’s combat power, including active service members, ammunition, new ships and new aircraft.
There is no magic number of dollars that the United States should be spending on defense, but the resources we have now are not enough to meet the simultaneous challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and terror groups across the globe. The further our defense capabilities fall behind the risks we face, the more costly it will be to catch up.
How did this happen? Over the past few decades Washington has traded a larger, more durable military force for one that is high-tech but brittle. Defense planners have made small quantities of expensive, cutting-edge weapons a priority over producing enough firepower for a long fight. This shift relied on advanced weapons having the power to end fighting decisively and quickly. Yet modern wars have evolved to require both advanced systems and sheer volume of 20th-century staple munitions, such as artillery shells and missiles.
Ukraine is using up to 15,000 artillery shells a day in its fight against Russia’s invasion. The United States produces only 40,000 shells each month.
The United States is also short on advanced munitions, such as precision-guided missiles. When America helped defend Israel from Iranian attacks late last year, our warships used a year’s worth of SM-3 interceptor missile production in a single night. Offensive strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen are likewise draining stocks of cruise missiles — the same kind that would be critical in a conflict in the Pacific. War games simulating a conflict with China estimate that the United States would run out of certain vital weapons, such as long-range anti-ship missiles, in as little as a week.
Our factories can’t increase production overnight. The U.S. Army has drastically scaled up production of artillery shells since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but only after years of growing investment and concerted effort. Even with similar investments, the Pentagon is struggling to increase production of more advanced precision munitions — which can take years to ramp up.
A big reason behind America’s shallow stocks of ammunition is the lack of demand from the main buyer: the U.S. government. Like any other company, defense contractors build only as much as they think they can sell. While recent investments spurred by Russia’s aggression are a step in the right direction, they need to be magnified. Unless the government shows that it wants to buy more, defense companies will never produce more.
Beyond having enough firepower in war, the military needs people to fire weapons. Recruiting has remained a consistent challenge for America’s armed forces, which are stretched thin across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, we have asked our military to shoulder more responsibility in more places with fewer people. This has led to extended deployments in combat zones, taxing our service members, ships and aircraft.
Budget constraints have forced the Department of Defense to defer nearly $140 billion in maintenance of its facilities. This cost-cutting allows problems to fester — like mold in army barracks, flooding in medical centers and general degradation of bases — that harm recruiting and our military strength. It is no surprise that only one-third of military families recommend that others join up.
Though the Pentagon’s budget is large, only about 17 percent goes to the purchase of new equipment and armaments. Most of our defense funds are used just to maintain the force we already have — with the majority of the defense budget allocated to the operation and maintenance of existing forces and growing personnel costs, which include pensions and much of the military health care system. As a result, the Pentagon is retiring old equipment more quickly than it buys new hardware. Construction of new equipment has been plagued by delays. Half-built submarines and ships that are years behind schedule sit in shipyards around the country.
Across the Pacific, estimates place China’s shipbuilding capacity at more than 200 times that of the United States, and we’ve approximated Beijing’s military budget to be more than triple what it claims publicly. Similarly, Moscow is channeling large investments into new drone, tank and missile production, enabling Russia to outproduce the United States and Europe.
If the United States hopes to retain its position as a global power, it needs a military force formidable enough to stave off any challenger. With Russia threatening security in Europe and China doing so in Asia, it is critical we marshal resources now.
Only 3.5 percent of the Pentagon’s budget is dedicated to investments in missiles and munitions. Policymakers should increase the efficiency and scope of the Pentagon’s ammunition purchases while making it clear to the defense industry that it will maintain the demand. Multiyear purchasing contracts, which allow the Pentagon to enter long-term deals rather than year-to-year negotiations, would do just that.
This applies to ships and planes, too. The United States should motivate its industries to build by opening new yards, using allies for maintenance on U.S. Navy vessels and ending the early retirement of young ships. That means making larger purchases and potentially working alongside allies with strong shipbuilding industries.
All the enhancements in producing the ammunition, ships and planes will be useless without a trained force to wield them. To improve recruiting numbers for our military, we should make life better for those who serve. No service member should face delayed medical care or be housed in unsafe conditions.
Over the past several decades, the U.S. military’s responsibilities have grown along with the challenges to our security. However, our national security spending has failed to meet our needs. It’s time for that to change.
Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow and Brady Africk is the deputy director of media relations and data design at the American Enterprise Institute.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
