In the May 10 editorial, “Seattle, don’t let the prospect of a bigger icebreaker fleet slip away,” the editorial board shared its perspective about the strategic significance of Washington’s icebreaker fleet to larger geopolitical concerns regarding the Arctic Sea. The editorial implored Washington elected leaders and maritime stakeholders to try and recapture Seattle’s host duties for a planned U.S. Coast Guard expansion on Seattle’s waterfront after a recent record of decision for Base Seattle revealed a smaller footprint for USCG’s future base of operations than was initially proposed.
Waterfront stakeholders who had been working with USCG for years on the expansion were just as puzzled as the editorial board by the final outcome. We have been advocating for a version of USCG’s Alternative 2, which would have maintained a balance between marine cargo throughput to support commercial shipping operations and additional berthing capacity to accommodate an expanded security cutter fleet.
Before the final record of decision was issued, the Coast Guard had articulated three potential base expansion pathways. First, the USCG’s preferred Alternative 1 would have expanded Base Seattle north onto Terminal 46, occupying up to 54.1 acres. Second, Alternative 2 would have occupied 13.5 to 21.5 acres at Terminal 30 and 5.5 acres at Terminal 46. And third, a “no-action” alternative, would have maintained the status quo.
From the get-go, Alternative 1 was incompatible with future economic development opportunities made possible by Seattle’s unique deep-water port. T46 abuts a naturally deep 50-foot water berth — perfect for the largest containerized cargo ships, while Coast Guard vessel drafts only range from 20 to 36 feet.
USCG’s preferred plan would have reduced commercial berthing capacity at T46 for larger commercial vessels, just as the NW Seaport Alliance is signing a letter of intent with a prospective tenant who is exploring opportunities to use the terminal at its full capacity. Every lost acre of terminal space on 46 would reduce our capacity to handle 3,500 shipping containers annually, potentially undermining future growth opportunities. Further, much of USCG’s proposed occupancy included office space to handle administrative functions and parking to accommodate single-occupancy vehicles, capacity that could easily be accommodated in the Alternative 2 footprint with multilevel structures.
Billions of dollars in public and private infrastructure investment have been made by taxpayers in Washington to advance the freight mobility infrastructure that surrounds T46 to support commercial shipping and related industries. Over 70,000 jobs across Washington state are dependent on regional import/export activities, including 7,160 direct jobs on the Seattle waterfront. Every direct job in marine cargo transportation creates an additional 1.9 jobs throughout our state’s economy. While the USCG expansion discussion is centered on the city of Seattle, our ports are statewide assets and agriculture exporters in Eastern Washington are paying attention. T46 is literally three stoplights from Boston, and our farmers are rooting for the NW Seaport Alliance to secure a customer. They depend on that access because it is crucial to their survival to have capacity in our ports to ship their goods.
Leaders at the city of Seattle and in Olympia could always be more attuned to the needs of our ports and regional freight networks, but it seemed clear that some version of Alternative 2 offered a path forward that was compatible with potential marine cargo volume growth and USCG’s expansion needs. Unfortunately, this conversation occurred amid a tumultuous administration change in Washington, D.C., and high-profile Coast Guard leadership turnover where pivotal decisions were scheduled to be made, but then delayed, throughout 2025. This was compounded by stop-and-go budget negotiations in Congress, with continued uncertainty riled by the midterm election cycle.
The editorial board suggests that indifference from Washington’s elected leaders is the cause for a disappointing USCG record of decision. But it takes two to tango. Local maritime industry stakeholders, economic development entities, and elected officials saw the path to a solution — but to reach that solution the USCG, impacted parties and elected leaders need to roll up their sleeves and do the hard work of negotiating an outcome that can work for everyone.
