CEMENT
Iran also ranks as one of the world’s largest cement producers. Its annual output of 70 million tonnes is largely exported to neighbouring countries. Iraq has historically been the main buyer of Iranian cement. Next in line are Kuwait, Afghanistan and Syria.
Iranian cement output was already constrained before the conflict by domestic gas shortages and electricity rationing. Exports of clinker, the main constituent of cement, were down 17 per cent in 2024 compared with the previous year. During the 2024 summer power crisis, 70 per cent of cement kilns also halted operations.
Reliable wartime figures are not yet available, but the strikes on Iran’s gas infrastructure have worsened the feedstock problem. Temporary suspensions of port operations, as happened in the southern Iraqi city of Basra in March following attacks on two tankers off the coast, have further hampered Iran’s ability to export cement.
Meanwhile, Iraq and Kuwait face a double bind. As Iranian cement supplies tighten, both countries are losing the means to compensate. Iraq ships 97 per cent of its energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz and Kuwait 100 per cent. Both have shut down production.
The collapse in state revenue is straining infrastructure budgets in these countries. So even where alternative supply exists – from Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – Iraq and Kuwait lack the fiscal capacity to absorb the higher costs.
For years, much analysis of Iran has focused on the country’s isolation. But, in reality, Iran is involved in supply chains all over the world – from food to chemicals and building materials. The war has made this abundantly clear.
Farhang Morady is a reader in International Development at the University of Westminster. This article first appeared in The Conversation.
