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The writer is distinguished fellow and the former director of Chatham House
It is depressing but hardly surprising that European leaders failed in Paris last week to agree on providing security guarantees to Ukraine. When it comes to addressing matters of war and peace, European governments are always on the back foot. They represent small and mid-sized countries that have sheltered for decades under America’s nuclear umbrella and conventional military power.
But European governments have collective economic clout. They and the EU have imposed 15 rounds of sanctions on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which are costing Russia dearly. It would be unforgivable, therefore, if Europeans prove to be as unprepared for the economic consequences of Donald Trump’s peace — above all his readiness to lift western sanctions on Russia in return for an end to the fighting — as they have been by the military.
European governments urgently need to develop an inventory of those sanctions they would be willing to lift to help secure a peace. And their position must be communicated to Washington as quickly as possible. Otherwise Trump might make concessions on sanctions unilaterally, present them as a fait accompli and then blame the Europeans if their reservations end up torpedoing his peace deal.
For example, European governments should refuse to return the roughly €250bn of Russian Central Bank reserves held by European financial institutions unless Moscow pays full war reparations. But they could let certain Russian banks back into the Swift payments system to settle their trades with foreign counterparts on unsanctioned trade. They could also allow their financial institutions to insure Russian oil tankers, without mandating a sale price cap of $60 a barrel transported. After all, if Trump follows through on his promise to massively increase US oil exports, this could drive the price of Russian oil below the cap in any case.
But, even as they consider which sanctions to lift and which to keep, Europeans must accept that Trump views the sanctions through a very different lens. Ukraine is a pawn in a bigger power play for his administration. Ending the war could help split Russia from China and thereby weaken Beijing strategically, which is the overwhelming US priority.
Europe’s main strategic priorities, meanwhile, are ensuring Ukraine’s survival as a sustainably sovereign state and preventing Russia from using military force to annex territory or establish a sphere of influence beyond its borders. So long as Putin threatens these objectives, Europeans will want to keep some sanctions in place.
Moreover, Trump is not interested in a just peace; he is only interested in peace. He has made it clear that big powers can do what they want and that international law should be ignored or neutered. In contrast, Europeans are committed to international law because it upholds the security of smaller states. Lifting sanctions on Russia after it has annexed the sovereign territory of Ukraine would be hard enough to accept. Doing so without Russia being held to account for war crimes in Ukraine is a non-starter.
So, while they consider their position on sanctions, Europeans also need to find points of leverage with Trump. His demand that Ukraine give the US a long-term concession to some 50 per cent of Ukraine’s critical minerals as payment for America’s past military support, offers one such opportunity. Europeans could put forward their own plans for investment alongside the US in Ukraine’s natural resources, as part of a larger package deal that would include the European security guarantees — and US military back-up — to protect their collective assets into the future.
Trump won’t readily provide a “backstop” to help Europeans defend Ukraine’s sovereignty; but he might do so if it helps protect his investment.
