AN INEVITABLE BREAKDOWN IN TALKS
A breakdown in US-Iranian negotiations was almost inevitable as both parties interpreted the MOU differently.
Iran reads the first half of the memorandum’s Article 5 stipulation that it “make arrangements … for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days” as confirmation of its legitimate control of the strait. That is why Iran sees US encouragement of shipping through Omani waters as an effort to deprive it of its greatest asset in the negotiations and most effective tool to deter future attacks.
Iran has, so far, refrained from acting on the second half of Article 5 that obliges it to “define the future administration and maritime services in the strait” in discussion with not only Oman, which stretches along the southern coast of the strait, but also the other Gulf littoral states. It has held inconclusive talks with Oman since signing the MOU but has yet to involve the Gulf states and Iraq.
Iran’s claim that it has a right to control the strait has been in the making for decades. For example, despite signing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which guarantees that “all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage” in waters considered international waterways, it has delayed ratification, while insisting that the convention does not apply to non-parties. The Iranian parliament went a step further in 1993 by passing legislation that defined the strait as Iranian territorial water.
For its part, the US, supported by the Gulf states, insists that the strait is an international waterway and should revert to its pre-war status, with no Iranian control over which ships can pass through and no levying of fees or tolls.
