The United States-Israeli war on Iran is just one day old, and it is already clear it will have a profound impact on the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. The US-Israeli bombardment of Iran has killed a number of high-ranking officials as well as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Tehran has responded by attacking not just Israel but also various countries in the region.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman were all struck by Iranian missiles or drones, even though none of these countries had launched attacks on Iran from their territory. Various sites across these states were targeted, including US military bases, airports, ports and even commercial areas.
If the conflict drags on, it could become a real turning point for the Gulf – one that reshapes how states think about security, alliances and even their long-term economic futures.
For years, Gulf stability has leaned on a familiar set of assumptions: The United States remained the dominant security guarantor; rivalry with Iran was managed, contained and kept below the threshold of full confrontation; and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – despite its disagreements – provided enough coordination to prevent regional politics from unravelling entirely. A sustained conflict involving the US, Israel and Iran would strain all of that at once. It would push Gulf capitals to revisit not only their defence planning but also the deeper logic of their regional strategy.
In recent years, Gulf diplomacy had already been shifting – carefully, quietly and with a strong preference for hedging rather than choosing sides. The Saudi-Iran thaw brokered by China in 2023, the UAE’s pragmatic channels with Tehran and Oman’s steady mediation role all point to the same idea: Stability requires dialogue, even when mistrust runs deep. Qatar has also kept doors open, betting on diplomacy and de-escalation as a way to reduce risk.
But a prolonged war would make that balancing act much harder to sustain. Pressure would rise from Washington to show clearer alignment. Domestic opinion would demand firmer answers about where national interests truly stand. Regional polarisation would intensify. In that kind of environment, strategic ambiguity stops looking like smart flexibility and starts looking like vulnerability because everyone wants you to pick a side.
The economic shockwaves could be just as significant. Any extended conflict tied to Iran immediately puts maritime chokepoints back at the centre of global attention, especially the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most sensitive arteries in the world economy. Even limited disruptions could trigger sharp energy price increases, higher insurance and shipping costs, and renewed investor anxiety.
Yes, higher oil prices could boost revenues in the short term, but sustained volatility carries a different cost. It could scare away long-term capital, complicate megaproject financing and raise borrowing costs at exactly the moment many Gulf states are trying to accelerate diversification.
There is also a longer-term strategic risk. Major consumers, especially in Asia, may decide that repeated instability is reason enough to speed up diversification away from Gulf energy resources. Over time, that would quietly reduce the region’s leverage, even if it remains a major energy supplier.
Inside the GCC, the war could either push states closer together or expose the cracks. The bloc has always moved between unity and rivalry, and a crisis doesn’t automatically produce cohesion. Different members have different threat perceptions and different comfort levels with risk. Oman and Qatar have typically valued mediation and communication channels with Tehran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have leaned more heavily towards deterrence, even if both have recently invested in de-escalation. Kuwait tends to balance carefully and avoid hard positioning.
If the conflict escalates unpredictably, those differences could resurface and strain coordination. But the opposite outcome is also possible. The crisis could drive deeper cooperation on missile defence, intelligence sharing and maritime security. Which direction the GCC takes will depend less on outside pressure and more on whether member states see this as a moment to compete or a moment to close ranks.
Zooming out, a prolonged war would also accelerate larger geopolitical realignments. China and Russia would not remain passive. Beijing, deeply invested in Gulf energy flows and regional connectivity, may expand its diplomatic footprint and present itself as a stabilising intermediary. Moscow could exploit the turmoil to increase arms sales and leverage regional divisions.
Meanwhile, if US military engagement deepens but Washington’s political bandwidth narrows, Gulf states may find themselves in a complicated position – more dependent on American security support yet more cautious about relying on a single patron. That dynamic could produce a new pattern, something like conditional alignment, where Gulf capitals cooperate militarily with the US but widen their economic and diplomatic options to avoid overdependence.
The deepest change, though, may not be military or economic. It may be cultural, in strategic terms. The Gulf states have spent decades prioritising stability, modernisation and careful geopolitical manoeuvring. A sustained regional war could disrupt that model. It could force painful trade-offs between security imperatives and development ambitions, between diplomatic flexibility and alliance discipline, between the desire to avoid escalation and the reality of living next door to it.
That is why the Gulf now feels like it is standing at a crossroads. It could become the front line of a prolonged, great power-inflected confrontation – or it could leverage the diplomatic capital it has built to push for de-escalation while strengthening its defensive resilience. Either way, the outcome won’t just shape Gulf security thinking. It could influence the region’s entire political architecture for years – possibly decades – to come.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
