While the neocons remain obsessed with Russia and Iran, President Erdogan has been steadily positioning Turkey to become the dominant military power in the Middle East. Reuters has now reported that Turkey is preparing to seek parliamentary authorization to deploy military personnel to Saudi Arabia under a new defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
This is an extraordinary development that deserves far more attention than it is receiving. Turkey is a NATO member with the alliance’s second-largest military by active personnel, yet it is now constructing a separate military arrangement in the Middle East that could fundamentally alter the balance of power.
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed in August 2026 by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Ankara submitted the agreement to parliament for ratification on October 20, and officials are preparing a separate mandate permitting Turkish personnel to operate in Saudi Arabia. The agreement treats an external attack against one member as an attack against all three, creating a mutual-defense commitment outside NATO. Turkish officials insist that the initial deployment will involve technical specialists, air defense systems, electronic warfare, intelligence sharing, and other defensive capabilities rather than offensive combat operations.
Nevertheless, we are watching Turkey establish a formal military presence in Saudi Arabia while simultaneously joining a Saudi-led effort to secure navigation through the Red Sea. This is no insignificant military cooperation agreement. It is the beginning of a new regional security structure.
The Ottoman Empire ruled much of the Middle East, North Africa, and southeastern Europe for centuries before its final collapse following World War I. Its formal dissolution was completed with the abolition of the sultanate in 1922. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked Ottoman history and promoted Turkey as a leading power within the Islamic world. Turkey was positioning itself to reassert its influence over regions that had once been governed from Constantinople.
Saudi Arabia is particularly significant because it is home to Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities in Islam. The Ottoman Empire once exercised authority over the Hejaz, and Turkish military personnel returning to Saudi Arabia under a mutual-defense arrangement carries enormous historical significance. Erdoğan is not sending an invading army to conquer Arabia. He is obtaining influence through military cooperation, weapons systems, and security commitments. That is how regional powers expand their reach without immediately resorting to territorial conquest. Saudi Arabia gains access to Turkish military technology and expertise, while Ankara gains a much stronger position in the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea. Pakistan’s participation adds another dimension because it possesses nuclear weapons, although this agreement does not automatically extend a nuclear guarantee to either partner.
Erdoğan has become one of Israel’s most vocal critics, and the two countries have competing interests in Syria and the broader Middle East. Turkey’s growing military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will inevitably be examined in Jerusalem because it changes the strategic environment surrounding Israel. We are no longer dealing with the same regional balance that existed when Israel could concentrate primarily on Iran and its allied militias. Turkey possesses a far larger conventional military establishment than many of the regional actors Israel has confronted, along with an expanding domestic defense industry capable of producing drones, missiles, armored vehicles, and naval systems.
The NATO implications are equally important. Turkey controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, providing access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It occupies a geographical position that NATO cannot easily replace, and its military manpower exceeds that of every other NATO member except the United States. Yet Erdoğan has repeatedly demonstrated that Turkey will pursue its own national interests even when they conflict with Washington or Brussels.
Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system despite American objections, maintained relations with Moscow during the Ukraine war, and has increasingly pursued independent diplomatic and military arrangements. I discussed the possibility of Turkey breaking with NATO as far back as my writings on the 2026 geopolitical turning point. That remains a possibility worth watching, but Turkey has not announced that it intends to withdraw, and its new agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan does not itself require such a break.
In fact, Erdoğan may find that remaining inside NATO while developing alternative alliances gives him considerably more leverage than leaving the organization. Turkey benefits from NATO’s security guarantees while possessing the military strength and geographical importance to negotiate with both Western and non-Western powers. Washington cannot simply treat Turkey as another minor ally that will obediently follow American foreign policy. European governments depend upon Ankara for migration management, Black Sea security, and access to important trade and energy routes. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan now see Turkey as an increasingly important military partner. Erdoğan is placing himself in a position where competing powers must negotiate with Ankara rather than ignore it.
The Red Sea is another critical part of this development. Houthi attacks have threatened one of the world’s most important commercial shipping routes, disrupting maritime trade and increasing transportation and insurance costs. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, making it essential for vessels traveling through the Suez Canal. Turkey’s participation in a Saudi-led maritime security arrangement gives Ankara a greater role in protecting an international trade corridor that directly affects European and Asian commerce. Control over strategic waterways has always been central to the rise of major powers. Turkey already commands the passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and now it is extending its military influence toward another of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
The West has spent years treating Turkey as a difficult but ultimately dependable NATO partner. Ankara has its own objectives, its own regional rivals, and the military capability to pursue policies that do not necessarily align with Washington or Brussels. Whether Erdoğan eventually breaks with NATO or continues using membership to strengthen his negotiating position remains to be seen. Anyone studying the expanding War Cycle should be paying very close attention to Turkey.
