THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS
Full texts of the ceasefires in Ukraine and Iran have not been published. But public statements from people involved suggest that neither agreement included strong compliance or demobilisation mechanisms, and did not involve extensive consideration of longer-term security guarantees.
When announcing the initial Apr 7 ceasefire, for example, Trump said the US had agreed to a limited two-week suspension of force in exchange for the Iranian reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. But he made no reference to how compliance would be monitored or enforced by a third party, or what military actions would be mutually considered a violation.
Many analysts have noted Trump’s preference for reaching quick, transactional “deals” over sustainable agreements. Others have argued that his eagerness to announce conflicts as being solved is reducing ceasefires from being a tangible step on the exit route out of conflict to “performative diplomacy”.
It is also hard to see how the international system can enforce compliance with ceasefires in the Iran and Ukraine wars. The US and Russia’s membership of the United Nations Security Council means either country can veto attempts by the UN to constrain their conduct by, for example, deploying an international peacekeeping force.
Indeed, the refusal of key US allies in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia to facilitate a recent American operation to escort oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, seems to be what has sustained the April ceasefire rather than agreed ceasefire terms or official compliance mechanisms. Iran had warned that it would respond to the operation with escalation and attacks.
