Over 60% of total tariff revenue in 2025 stemmed from tariffs imposed under IEEPA, which has never before been used to implement tariffs. This includes country-by-country or “reciprocal” tariffs ranging from 34% for China to a 10% baseline for the rest of the world, and a 25% tariff Trump imposed on goods from Canada, China and Mexico for what the administration said was their failure to curb the flow of fentanyl.
The decision does not affect ALL of Trump’s tariffs, leaving in place ones he imposed on steel and aluminum using different laws. U.S. Customs and Border Protection collected about $133.5 billion of tariff revenue under IEEPA in fiscal year 2025 and in fiscal year 2026 through December 14, representing about 60% of total tariff revenue collected during that time. Trump could seek to reimpose some tariffs using other laws. Companies that had to pay the tariffs may be able to seek a refund from the Treasury Department. Hundreds have already sued.
The Statutory Framework: Duties vs Tariffs
There is indeed a substantial difference between traditional tariffs requiring Congressional approval and various duties, fees, and restrictions the President can impose unilaterally under existing statutory authority. Trump’s first term demonstrated willingness to exploit these authorities aggressively, and a second term will likely see even more creative use of executive power to reshape trade flows without seeking Congressional authorization.
Congress has delegated broad trade authority to the President through various statutes enacted over the past century. These delegations were intended for specific circumstances—national security emergencies, unfair trade practices, international negotiations—but the statutory language is often vague enough to permit aggressive interpretation. Trump demonstrated that these authorities, when pushed to their limits, provide enormous unilateral power over trade policy.
The key distinction is this: Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” However, Congress has chosen to delegate much of this authority to the President through statutes. Once delegated, the President can act without further Congressional approval unless Congress revokes the delegation—which requires passing legislation that can survive presidential veto, a high bar given partisan polarization. This is what Congress does most of the time. They delegate powers to unelected agencies. I believe this undermines the entire Constitutional framework, but that is just my personal opinion.
Section 232: National Security Tariffs
The most powerful tool is Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorizes the President to impose tariffs or other import restrictions when imports threaten to impair national security. This provision was rarely used until Trump weaponized it during his first term. I cannot explain what he did not use this statute. I think whomever advised him was trying to covertly undermine him.
The statute requires the Commerce Department to investigate whether imports threaten national security, but “national security” is undefined and interpreted broadly. The President has essentially unreviewable discretion to determine what constitutes a national security threat.
During Trump’s First-Term, he imposed 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminum under Section 232 in 2018, affecting imports from virtually all countries including allies like Canada and the European Union. The ratification was that domestic steel and aluminum production capacity is essential to defense industrial base—without it, America cannot manufacture tanks, aircraft, ships, and weapons during wartime. The legal arguments were stretched but survived judicial challenge. Courts have been extremely deferential to presidential determinations of national security, recognizing this as a core executive function.
Section 232 authority could theoretically be applied to virtually any critical industry. For example, semiconductors and electronics were targeted during first term but not fully implemented. The argument is straightforward. Modern weapons systems depend entirely on advanced semiconductors. If America cannot produce these domestically and depends on Taiwan, which is vulnerable to Chinese invasion thanks to Biden & Pelosi as well as South Korea, which is vulnerable to North Korean attack. In such cases, national security is imperiled.
This could justify 25-50% tariffs on semiconductor imports from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and potentially even allied producers like Japan and Europe to force production back to the United States. As I have articulated, nobody wants to look at the real reason manufacture left in the first place – excessive progressive taxation line Newsom in California or Mandami in NYC. The CHIPS Act provides subsidies for domestic production; Section 232 tariffs would provide the stick to complement the carrot.
Turning to the Pharmaceuticals and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, here too America imports approximately 80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients, predominantly from China and India. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed this vulnerability when supply chains disrupted. Section 232 could justify tariffs forcing pharmaceutical production back to America or trusted allies.
Then there is the Rare Earth Elements. Here, China controls 60-70% of global rare earth production and 90% of processing. These materials are essential for electronics, batteries, magnets in defense systems, and countless other applications. To make onw F35 you need 900 pounds of Rare Earths. Section 232 tariffs could target rare earth imports to incentivize domestic production, though this would be economically painful given the lack of current U.S. capacity.
Trump repeatedly threatened to impose Section 232 tariffs on automobile imports, arguing that domestic auto manufacturing capability is essential to defense industrial base, which is BS. They argue that vehicles, engines, manufacturing expertise is transferable to military production in time of war. So you should pay double for a Toyota or BMW to make it more profitable for over-regulated manufactures that only support further socialism. This was NOT implemented during the first term but remains available.
A 25% tariff on automobile imports would be catastrophic for foreign manufacturers and would force massive restructuring of the industry. It would also significantly increase vehicle prices for American consumers, creating political backlash. I think if Trump tried this, he would be bounced out of office.
Lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and other materials essential for batteries, electronics, and defense applications could justify Section 232 actions. America imports the vast majority of these materials, creating strategic vulnerability.
As you can see, there is an advantage of Section 232 is that it provides unilateral authority with minimal procedural requirements and virtually no judicial review. Once the Commerce Department investigation concludes (a process controlled by the administration), the President can impose restrictions immediately.
Section 301: Unfair Trade Practices
Then there is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President through the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate and retaliate against foreign unfair trade practices, including intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory regulations, and trade agreement violations. The USTR must investigate and determine whether foreign practices are “unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Upon such determination, the President can impose tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions.
Here, under Trump’s First Term, the China tariffs affected over $350 billion in annual imports. They were imposed primarily under Section 301 authority based on USTR investigation finding systematic Chinese IP theft, forced technology transfer, and unfair industrial policies. These tariffs started at 10-25% on various product categories and escalated during the trade war, ultimately affecting nearly all Chinese imports. The Section 301 authority provided legal basis without requiring Congressional approval.
The Biden administration maintained most Trump-era China tariffs and even increased some. A second Trump term could expand these to 60% or higher as Trump proposed during the 2024 campaign on all Chinese imports, effectively attempting to decouple the economies. That would increase geopolitical tensions.
Section 301 investigations could target EU digital services taxes affecting American tech companies, agricultural subsidies harming American farmers, or regulatory barriers like GDPR compliance costs. Retaliatory tariffs on European automobiles, luxury goods, wine, cheese, and other products could be justified under Section 301.
Then there is the Indian pharmaceutical manufacturing advantages partly result from regulatory arbitrage and IP protections weaker than U.S. standards. Section 301 could justify tariffs on Indian pharmaceutical imports or generic drugs. This could put a lot of people at health risk.
Vietnam and Southeast Asia countries have become transshipment points for Chinese goods attempting to evade tariffs. Section 301 authority could be used to impose tariffs on countries facilitating Chinese circumvention.
The Section 301 process requires investigation and findings but remains under executive control. The USTR can initiate investigations at presidential direction and reach conclusions supporting administration policy objectives.
There are a lot of other means available:
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Countervailing Duties and Anti-Dumping
Reciprocal Tariffs and “Mirror Tariffs”
Import Licensing and Quota Systems
Currency Manipulation Tariffs
Border Adjustment Mechanisms
The proliferation of presidential trade authorities creates flexibility to implement protectionist policies without Congressional approval:
- Section 232 for national security-related industries
- Section 301 for unfair trade practices
- IEEPA for emergency situations or coercive diplomacy
- CVD/AD for industry-specific protection
- Quotas and licensing for quantitative restrictions
- Currency-based measures for exchange rate issues
A comprehensive Trump trade strategy could layer these authorities, using different legal bases for different objectives while maintaining that each action is legally justified under existing statute. This approach is legally defensible (though challengeable) while politically controversial.
The fundamental question is whether Congress will tolerate continued expansion of executive trade authority or will attempt to reassert legislative control. Given partisan polarization and dysfunction, reassertion seems unlikely unless trade actions become so economically painful that bipartisan opposition emerges.
